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Abstract 
For nearly eighty years, historians have debated whether the western powers or the USSR 
should be blamed for the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in 1939. This rather 
tired debate features here, but only in the background. Instead, these negotiations provide a 
case-study for exploring the interface between the press, public opinion, and foreign policy-
making, identifying an example of how policymakers’ perceptions of popular opinion wielded 
a tangible impact on diplomacy. The article will show that, from late April through to early 
June 1939, British and French public opinion, as mediated by the press, demanded a ‘Grand 
Alliance’. The popular pressure needed to facilitate a Soviet alliance was in place, and, 
combined with broader diplomatic and strategic imperatives, nearly delivered one. 
Perceptions of public opinion also help explain why this alliance remained elusive. 
Emboldened by their own readings of western newspapers, the USSR increased their 
demands, confident that domestic pressures would compel London and Paris to yield. But this 
was a fatal miscalculation. From mid-June, Western opinion turned against Moscow, and 
familiar anti-Soviet tropes resurfaced. By charting this evolution in public sentiment, this 
article provides a fresh perspective on the factors contributing to the failure of these 
negotiations.  
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Critics of the British and French policy of appeasement in the late-1930s have many 
weapons at their disposal, including the failure to secure a ‘Grand Alliance’ with 
Soviet Russia. The charge levelled at the appeasers is that ideological antipathy to 
Russian bolshevism – often combined with far-right sympathies – led to a myopic 
rejection of sincere Soviet overtures, compelling Stalin to seek a temporary 
accommodation with Nazi Germany.1 As Churchill put it in The Gathering Storm, 
Britain and France ‘payed dearly’ for the astonishing ‘indifference’ and ‘disdain’ with 
which they treated the USSR ahead of the Second World War.2 Hitler avoided a two-
front war (once Poland had been eliminated), the Wehrmacht defeated France in a 
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matter of weeks, and Britain was exposed to invasion by summer 1940. This orthodox 
narrative has been challenged: Russian culpability has been emphasised in both 
Stalin’s own ideological prejudices and his proclivity for purges that rendered the 
USSR an unreliable ally by the late 1930s.3 Some scholars blame both sides in equal 
measure, while others offer justifications for western scepticism, but a strong seam 
within the historiography accuses the anti-Soviet appeasers of deliberately sabotaging 
the negotiations.4 P.M.H. Bell, however, considers the blame game unhelpful. There 
was, he suggests, simply no likelihood of success, as Moscow’s price for an alliance – 
a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe –always exceeded what the west 
(notably London) was willing to pay.5 Agreeing with Bell that looking to attribute 
blame for the failed negotiations is unhelpful, this article differs in not sharing his 
fatalistic view of the talks as doomed to failure. It will be suggested instead that the 
west came very close to accepting Moscow’s price, and that public opinion – as 
mediated by the popular press – played a crucial role in pushing the British and 
French governments towards a position of acceptance.  
 
Across all analyses, irrespective of where blame is apportioned, the impact of western 
public opinion recurs frequently if peripherally. Numerous historians highlight how 
British opinion polls and press commentary dovetailed with French pressure and the 
spectre of a Russo-German accommodation to enhance the allure of a Soviet alliance.6 
Others, identifying a parallel clamour for an alliance in France, contend that French 
public opinion hardened against the fascist dictatorships in the months following the 
Munich settlement.7 But the precise influence of public opinion on British and French 
policy towards the Anglo-Franco-Soviet discussions in 1939 merits closer scrutiny 
because this was a rare example of it wielding a tangible influence on policymakers. 
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This article offers a detailed analysis of the British and French press during the spring 
and summer of 1939, partially recreating the atmosphere in which policymakers 
contemplated an alliance, and thus the extent to which elite perceptions of popular 
opinion affected their decisions. Press support for a peace front inclusive of Russia, 
though never unanimous, peaked from mid-April to early June 1939. In combination 
with other factors, favourable press coverage afforded London and Paris the necessary 
latitude to offer Moscow concessions that could potentially facilitate an alliance. 
However, this enthusiasm was ephemeral and ultimately counter-productive. It 
emboldened Moscow, encouraging them to raise their demands, which in turn 
antagonised the British and French governments and reignited latent right-wing 
opposition. Thereafter, the Soviet and western positions grew further apart, and elite 
understandings of public opinion would never again be powerful enough to persuade 
reluctant politicians to change tack.  
 
The press, public opinion, and policymaking 
 
This article will first trace the evolution of public opinion, as perceived and 
understood by the decision-making elites, during spring and summer 1939. The 
analysis will use indicators of public opinion relied upon by contemporaries, 
principally the printed press. French and British newspapers of all political shades are 
considered, as political and diplomatic elites (notably the British Prime Minister, 
Neville Chamberlain, and his French counterpart, Édouard Daladier) were attentive to 
newspaper commentary. Although a broad cross-section of newspapers is surveyed, 
emphasis is focused on those tendencies of press opinion that most concerned the 
respective Premiers. Daladier was particularly alert to potential discontent on the 
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political left, especially given his recent efforts to steer France away from the 
experiment of the Popular Front era.8 Chamberlain, by contrast, was unperturbed by 
leftist critiques but was troubled by indications of dissent in conservative circles.9 The 
following analysis will also prioritise editorials and articles penned by prominent 
individuals, as these warranted the most attention. The apparent readership habits of 
the elites will also be echoed here, focusing on the prominent daily newspapers 
emanating from London and Paris, although prominent provincial papers are not 
excluded entirely. Finally, the analysis will focus on press commentary from mid-
April to early June, when discussion of the negotiations spiked and, crucially, when a 
degree of unanimity was most apparent.  
 
Although a reading of the press is an imperfect mechanism for gauging genuine 
public opinion, it is useful when gauging elite perceptions of the popular mood. After 
all, if one is interested in the interface between public opinion and policymaking, 
public opinion as it was matters less than public opinion as it was understood in 
policymaking circles. The surviving archival record in Britain and France suggests 
that elite perceptions of public opinion relied heavily on the press. Opinion polling 
was a new phenomenon, arriving in Britain in 1937 and in France the following year. 
Several early polls conducted by the British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO) were 
published in the News Chronicle and provided some ammunition for the anti-
appeasers, but the majority of the British elite viewed polls with suspicion, often 
dismissing their practitioners as leftist cranks in the mould of Mass Observation.10 In 
France, the early polls commissioned by the Institut français d’opinion publique 
(IFOP) barely featured in the papers and seemingly left no impression in 
policymaking circles.11 Indeed, other than infrequent allusions to ‘the man in the 
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street’ in official and private correspondence, and beyond opaque references to 
‘public opinion’ in parliamentary debates, historians ascertaining elite conceptions of 
public opinion have little to work with other than the popular press.  
 
Chamberlain was certainly sensitive to press commentary, and his diary letters reveal 
a particular attentiveness to comments in conservative papers like The Times and The 
Daily Telegraph. Given his secure parliamentary position, he could afford to be less 
troubled by critiques in leftist or liberal publications. The official opposition was 
weak; the Liberals lacked numbers and influence, while the Labour Party suffered 
from internal division and discord. Being able to shrug off leftist criticism was not a 
luxury afforded to Daladier. Although one of the architects of the Front populaire, he 
had provoked the ire of the political left since becoming President of the Council for 
the third time in April 1938. Intent on initiating a French redressement, he risked 
reneging on such sacred policies as the 40-hour week, leading critics to label him the 
fossoyeur of the Popular Front.12 Indeed, the Socialist and Communist press routinely 
criticised Daladier during summer 1938, and the sizeable dossier of press cuttings 
preserved in his personal papers brims with extracts from leftist newspapers, 
indicating his concerns. Such critiques contributed to Daladier’s refusal to celebrate 
the Munich accords as a triumph, in stark contrast to Chamberlain who reveled in his 
personal triumph. While Munich encouraged Chamberlain to pursue appeasement 
further, Daladier steered a different course, and his firm rejection of Italian territorial 
demands in the winter was approved with near-unanimity in French papers. Indeed, 
France’s gravitation towards a foreign policy of firmness rather than capitulation 
provided a rare source of cross-party unity, vital as Daladier pressed ahead with 
domestic reforms that continued to prompt Socialist and Communist ire. Once 
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Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the French public’s appetite for 
resistance appeared undiminished, and Daladier’s resolute response to Hitler’s latest 
coup again met with widespread public approval. 
 
Chamberlain’s response to the Prague coup was lacklustre in comparison. His initial 
refusal to admit the failure of his Munich policy provoked widespread public and 
parliamentary dissatisfaction, compelling him to adopt more forceful rhetoric and 
policies thereafter, notably the guarantee of Poland against German aggression.13 A 
key component in an emergent ‘dam in the east’ was Soviet Russia, so after the 
Prague coup the creation of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet ‘Grand Alliance’ was 
contemplated more seriously. For both Chamberlain and Daladier the stakes were 
high. Chamberlain was instinctively hostile to the USSR for ideological reasons, but 
he also feared that a Soviet pact would preclude the further appeasement of Germany 
or Italy. Daladier was conscious that the troublesome left would demand such an 
alliance, but he was also mindful that the French political right – on which he relied 
for parliamentary support – found the prospect inherently troubling.14 Anti-Soviet 
sentiment remained a constant if fluctuating factor in both democratic countries, but, 
where Daladier risked ignoring it in deference to the perceived strategic benefits, 
Chamberlain saw it as confirmation that his own scepticism was justified.15  
 
Whether Chamberlain was accurate in his reading of British public attitudes towards 
the USSR is questionable. After all, given the elusive nature of public opinion it is 
difficult for any policymaker to gauge accurately what their public wants. In his study 
of public opinion and Anglo-Soviet relations during the Second World War, P.M.H. 
Bell notes how policymakers used various mechanisms for gauging the public mood. 
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On the one hand, the wartime Ministry of Information made use of Gallup opinion 
polls, Mass Observation data, and BBC audience monitoring reports. On the other, 
policymakers continued to fall back on existing, pre-war mechanisms, notably 
Parliamentary discussion, views expressed by pressure groups, and press 
commentary.16 When considering public opinion’s influence prior to the outbreak of 
war, the latter are pivotal and represent three of the four categories of public opinion 
identified by Bell: first, parliament was an echo chamber for ‘political opinion’; 
second, pressure groups, trade unions, and party activists represented a broader 
‘political nation’; and third, the press – newspapers primarily, but also the radio and 
cinema – represented the ‘mass media’ and its ambiguous role as both a reflector and 
a shaper of public opinion. Bell labeled his fourth category ‘public opinion tout court, 
or mass opinion’, a more amorphous and all-encompassing entity that is difficult to 
identify even with the aid of the most rigorous and sophisticated polling techniques.17  
 
This problematic fourth kind of opinion was recognised by policymakers, but its 
resistance to definition left it vulnerable to misrepresentation. Simply put, opinion 
tout court could be whatever one wanted - or assumed - it to be. Regarding the Soviet 
negotiations in 1939, Daladier believed that mass opinion wanted an alliance despite 
the vocal protestations of the anti-Bolshevik right wing. Chamberlain, however, 
constantly sought, and received willingly, indications that mass opinion shared his 
hostility to a pact, even as pro-alliance voices proliferated in the press, in Parliament, 
and even within the Cabinet. The press demand thus coincided with an intensifying 
clamour from other indicators of opinion. In London and Paris, fears of a potential 
Nazi-Soviet rapprochement led the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay to advocate 
a Soviet alliance with more urgency. The broader ‘political nation’ also appeared 
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willing to embrace Russian assistance. In France, the Socialists and Communists were 
predictably vocal in their advocacy of a pact, and even sections of the right allowed 
pragmatism to override ideological scruples. In Britain, substantial sections of 
Conservative opinion, not least the troublesome ‘Glamour Boys’, was also inclined to 
put ideology aside given the urgency of combating the Nazi menace – supportive of a 
Russian alliance, even on terms more favourable to Moscow than the west.  
 
Press commentary on the negotiations 
 
Press commentary prior to 1939 reflected strains in Anglo-Soviet relations evident 
since the Russian Revolution of 1917. Beyond the Moscow-funded journals of the 
extreme-left, the USSR featured rarely in British newspapers, and when it did the 
coverage was often disparaging.18 France’s relations with Russia were similarly 
frosty. The French right routinely bemoaned Moscow’s pernicious influence on 
domestic politics, whilst fevered debates about the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935 
revealed the persistent ideological schisms induced by any potential association with 
Moscow.19 The USSR’s absence from the Munich Conference in September 1938 
illustrated further how London and Paris saw little advantage in aligning with Soviet 
Russia, the western governments convinced that Stalin’s purges had destroyed the 
Red Army’s ability to intervene effectively on behalf of Czechoslovakia.20 In 
addition, the right wing press in France warned consistently that Moscow sought a 
general European conflict to further their revolutionary ends: Le Temps argued that 
the Communists ‘wanted an ideological war’ in Europe and a ‘social war’ in France.21 
In Britain, where the internal communist threat was negligible, outspoken criticism of 
Russia was less prominent, and some left-leaning and liberal papers actually 
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questioned the marginalisation of Russia during the Sudeten crisis.22 Such comments, 
however, were uncommon, and overall press commentary on Soviet Russia was 
scarce. 
 
Just as Britain and France harboured longstanding suspicions of the USSR, so too was 
the Soviet leadership prejudiced against the west. Although Foreign Minister Maxim 
Litvinov had advocated collective security since the mid-1930s, many in Moscow 
suspected the western powers of trying to embroil Russia into an imperialist war. In 
an oft-quoted speech of 10 March 1939, Stalin warned that the USSR was unwilling 
to pull the west’s ‘chestnuts out of the fire’ by fighting Nazi Germany on their 
behalf.23 Even after Prague, a sceptical Soviet Union questioned how far the western 
democracies had substituted firmness for appeasement. Some historians consider this 
scepticism to be justified given the west’s proclivity for ostracizing Russia, Michael 
Carley equating French and British suspicions of Moscow’s integrity to ‘Mr. Pot 
calling Comrade Kettle black.’24 To be sure, London’s post-Prague firmness could be 
interpreted less as a change of policy than an adaptation of strategy. As Geoffrey 
Hicks suggests, the Poland guarantee was ‘the very antithesis’ of a Churchillian 
‘Grand Alliance’: a defensive and intentionally unprovocative move designed to 
facilitate further acts of appeasement. It also had the fortuitous side-effect of avoiding 
what many Conservatives abhorred – an alignment with Moscow.25 
 
Nevertheless, attitudes had started to shift. Rumours abounded in early 1939 that 
Hitler might unleash a knock-out blow in the west before turning his attention 
eastwards, prompting the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, to tell the Cabinet 
that ‘closer relations with Russia’ were desirable.26 A formal alliance was 
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contemplated even more seriously after Germany’s seizure of Czechoslovakia, an 
event that generated an unprecedented level of press interest. Newspaper coverage of 
the USSR was infrequent before 1939, and Claire Knight has suggested recently that 
‘sporadic’ coverage in the British press remained the norm throughout the triple 
alliance negotiations.27 However, closer scrutiny of a broad cross-section of 
newspapers demonstrates that the Soviet Union featured more prominently once 
formal discussions with Moscow were initiated after the Prague coup.28 Furthermore, 
impatience was apparent from the outset: France’s Ambassador at London, Charles 
Corbin, noted as early as 24 March that British newspapers bemoaned the lack of 
‘tangible results’ from the negotiations.29 The Soviet discussions also assumed a 
prominent place in the French press; Socialist and Communist papers condemned the 
apparent lethargy of their government. The Socialist former Premier, Léon Blum was 
one of several journalists to observe disapprovingly that Paris took a back seat while 
the British took the initiative.30 Such criticism was not confined to the more militant 
left; former Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos wrote in Paris-Soir that, unlike Paris, 
London had overcome its ‘ideological hostility,’ whilst Pierre Dominique, in the 
Radical La République, argued that the French government must similarly resist the 
temptation to blur ‘domestic and international questions.’31 However, the political 
right retained an instinctive anti-bolshevism. Léon Bailby emphasised the Soviet 
threat, accusing Moscow of indulging in ‘corruption and blackmail’ to influence 
French politicians and revive the Popular Front.32  
 
The conservative British press was dismissive of a Soviet pact for different reasons. 
The isolationist Daily Express deplored the new policy direction that amounted to ‘the 
encirclement of Germany.’33 Elsewhere, however, support for an alliance gathered 
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momentum. The Manchester Guardian maintained that ‘Russia, whatever the 
differences of opinion about her, stands against aggression,’ while the Sunday Times 
warned that it would be ‘the height of folly to disdain the help of Russia because we 
dislike her domestic policy.’34 Unsurprisingly, an alliance was also advocated on the 
political left, where suspicion of Chamberlain’s commitment to the negotiations was 
rife.35 The Daily Herald claimed that public opinion was ‘disturbed’ by suggestions 
that the British Government was deliberately obstructing an arrangement with 
Moscow.36 A similar note was struck by sections of the French press. Léon Blum 
insisted that any obstacles must be overcome in pursuit of the ‘immediate and 
intimate binding of all the powers determined to preserve peace.’37 The necessity of a 
pact was also acknowledged by some on the political right. The conservative deputy 
and journalist, Henri de Kérillis, was adamant that the pledges already undertaken 
could only be upheld with Soviet assistance, while the Paris-Midi put matters bluntly: 
‘We must look at things squarely. If one considers Hitler as the number one danger 
for Europe in 1939, use must be made of all means at our disposal.’38 But there was 
still no unanimity, because right wing support for an alliance was uncommon. Several 
publications emphasised repeatedly the dangers of domestic communism and warned 
that the interior menace posed by bolshevism demanded vigilance. Cautioning against 
a Franco-Soviet alignment, Bailby predicted that Moscow sought ‘by a thousand 
insidious means to induce us into an ideological war, marked with the most terrible 
risks.’39  
 
In Britain, meanwhile, the conservative press began to acknowledge a public desire 
for a pact. The Daily Telegraph suggested that it would ‘be approved by an 
overwhelming mass of British opinion’, and even the more reticent Daily Mail 
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conceded that an alliance should not be rejected ‘without the deepest consideration.’ 
Nevertheless, where French caution stemmed from the potential impact on domestic 
politics, British reservations were predicated on the potentially deleterious diplomatic 
repercussions. As the Daily Mail’s editorial continued, a Russian pact would preclude 
the securing of better relations with Italy, Spain, and Japan, even pushing these 
powers into Germany’s orbit.40 For pro-alliance papers, such concerns were 
considered insufficient justification for stalling. ‘The task of creating and cementing 
an alliance with Russia should now be made the first imperative duty of the British 
Government,’ argued the News Chronicle: ‘Delay will be unforgivable.’41 A further 
reason to lament the delays came on 4 May when Stalin dismissed the relatively pro-
western Litvinov from the Narkomindel, replacing him with the more quiescent 
Viacheslav Molotov. In France, Blum feared that this change marked a Soviet retreat 
into isolationism; the Intransigeant noted that it did not make ‘Anglo-Soviet 
conversations any easier,’ and the Petit Parisien saw it as a sign of Stalin’s 
determination to take personal control of Soviet diplomacy.42 A more cynical 
appraisal was provided by Wladimir d’Ormesson in Le Figaro, who accused the 
USSR of pursuing ‘three policies at once,’ creating a labyrinth in which only the 
Soviets knew where they stood.43 In Britain, the Evening Standard evoked the more 
troubling prospect of a German-Soviet accommodation: ‘We may yet see the German 
lion and the Russian lamb lie down together’.44  
 
Despite the unease, the change at the Narkomindel did not cause any immediate or 
significant change in Moscow’s approach to the talks. The Daily Mail reassured its 
readers that fears of a Soviet retreat into isolation ‘are proving to be unfounded,’ and 
the Daily Telegraph proclaimed confidently that Litvinov’s dismissal ‘does not 
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portend any departure by the Russian Government from their general policy of 
collaboration.’45 Nonetheless, rumours of a German-Soviet rapprochement, combined 
with the German-Italian Pact of Steel (22 May), made the construction of a peace 
front more urgent, hence growing unease at the faltering negotiations. Most British 
newspapers urged the rapid conclusion of an alliance, including the Daily Express. ‘It 
is plain,’ noted an editorial, ‘that the people want a military alliance with Russia, and 
are disturbed at the delay in getting it.’46 Seeking to bend intransigent ministers to 
their will, several newspapers, notably those owned by the hitherto isolationist Lord 
Beaverbrook, explicitly evoked public opinion. The Evening Standard contended that 
people favoured ‘a firm alliance’ with the USSR, and the Daily Express claimed that 
Britain was a country of ‘forty-seven million foreign secretaries’ whose voices would 
ultimately prevail.47 Such arguments were echoed on the left, the Daily Herald stating 
that no democratic government can ‘stand against public opinion’ and the Daily 
Worker adamant that the British public ‘demanded an Anglo-Soviet Pact.’ Advocates 
of a triple alliance in France struck a similar chord, Ce Soir warning that the British 
public would despair should their government fail to secure an agreement.48 
 
While the British press became more sympathetic to a Soviet alliance, French 
newspapers remained divided. Many on the right continued to indulge in vitriolic anti-
Soviet rhetoric, and it was argued repeatedly that French caution was justified by the 
domestic threat of communism. The Intransigeant, whilst acknowledging that a 
Russian pact was diplomatically ‘desirable’, warned that it might provoke serious 
domestic disturbances in France, a side effect that did not trouble Britain where 
communism has ‘no chance’ of taking hold.49 The suggestion that the marginal 
communist presence in Britain afforded London greater diplomatic latitude was 
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articulated freely. The Journal des débats noted that the size of the Parti communiste 
français (PCF) rendered the negotiations ‘more delicate’ for Paris than they were for 
London, an argument echoed by Jean Fabry in Le Matin in early June.50 As a result, 
press support for an alliance was less widespread in France, and dissenting voices 
were certainly vented more frequently. A demand existed nonetheless, and was 
expressed in predictably raucous terms on the political left.51 There was considerable 
unease at the failure to conclude an alliance with anger directed increasingly at the 
western governments. Residual hostility to Soviet Russia had weakened, and there 
was a willingness, even a determination, to finalise a pact at almost any price.  
 
By early June, however, the public’s support for a pact began to dissipate. A tendency 
emerged in British and French newspapers blaming the delays on Moscow rather than 
London or Paris. As old themes of Soviet duplicity and dishonesty resurfaced, the 
chances of securing a ‘Grand Alliance’ dwindled rapidly. Even newspapers that had 
previously embraced a Russian pact now began to stress that Russia’s absence from 
the ‘peace front’ was more detrimental to the USSR than it was for France and 
Britain.52 To be sure, the British government’s effort to expedite proceedings by 
sending a plenipotentiary to Moscow was criticised in some quarters, where it was 
anticipated correctly that the Soviets would resent the decision to send a little-known 
official, William Strang, rather than a more senior person, such as Halifax or his 
predecessor as Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden.53 But press patience with the USSR 
was starting to diminish. The Daily Telegraph openly challenged the widespread 
assumption that the western governments were responsible for the delays, instead 
pointing towards a ‘lack of mutual confidence’ that afflicted both sides, a position 
echoed in France by the Petit Parisien.54  
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Others went further; the Daily Express asserted that the ‘fault is on the side of the 
Russian Government’; Le Figaro castigated the ‘abominable’ manners of Soviet 
diplomats; and Pierre Bernus warned that the unscrupulous Stalin must be treated 
with caution.55 The two newspapers widely regarded as quasi-official mouthpieces for 
their respective governments – The Times and Le Temps – maintained a guarded 
optimism, although the latter notably ran an editorial seeking to convince its readers 
that ‘Soviet collaboration’ was by no means indispensable.56 Beyond the Soviet-
funded publications, the most notable pro-alliance press articles were those penned by 
prominent politicians. Such articles were more conspicuous in France, suggesting that 
anti-Soviet sentiment was recognised as being more problematic there than in Britain. 
Winston Churchill assured readers of Paris-Soir that ideological hostility towards the 
USSR no longer blinded either British or French public opinion to the ‘harmony of 
interests’ that made an Anglo-Franco-Soviet arrangement essential. In the same 
newspaper, Yvon Delbos insisted that existing obligations to Poland and Romania 
rendered an alliance essential.57 
 
Despite such arguments, anti-Russian press commentary increased through June and 
elicited a response from Moscow. Rebutting accusations of Soviet chicanery, an 
inflammatory article written by the USSR’s propaganda chief, Andrei Zhdanov, 
appeared in Pravda on 29 June, faithfully reproduced by the Humanité in France and 
the Daily Worker in Britain. The article accused London and Paris of lacking 
goodwill, and claimed that the western powers blamed Soviet ‘obstinacy’ for the 
failure to secure a triple alliance so as to ‘prepare their own public opinion for an 
eventual deal with the aggressors.’58 The Pravda article was certainly a rejoinder to 
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an emergent theme in western papers, but it would be erroneous to suggest that the 
British and French press were suddenly brimming with overtly anti-Soviet rhetoric. 
The biggest shift in press commentary in early summer 1939 was a change in focus 
rather than tone. By July, the press fixated squarely on the tensions surrounding 
Danzig at the expense of meaningful discussion of the Moscow talks. Instead, most 
newspapers simply published short and infrequent updates, usually couched in 
cautious optimism. In France, La Croix reported ‘favourable’ progress, and the Petit 
Parisien stated that the British Cabinet, swayed by public opinion, was now willing to 
work with the French to deliver a Soviet alliance.59 In Britain, an Evening Standard 
editorial of 4 July even claimed prematurely that Britain and the USSR had ‘come to 
terms’, the Russians having ‘won their case.’ There were still glimpses in the right 
wing press of overt anti-Soviet sentiment, especially in France,60 but the dampening 
enthusiasm for a Soviet alliance was attributable chiefly to this topic’s occupying 
fewer column inches than before. 
 
Even in early August, as Paris and London prepared to send delegations to Moscow to 
discuss a military pact, most newspapers remained confident that the slow but steady 
negotiations would bear fruit.61 Left-leaning papers occasionally chastised the western 
governments’ temporizing, but the overall tone was one of optimism regarding the 
eventual outcome.62 In this context, news of Ribbentrop’s imminent trip to Moscow 
came as a shock. British and French newspaper responses to the Ribbentrop-Molotov 
Pact followed predictable ideological trajectories. The Communist-inspired press 
adhered faithfully to Moscow’s line, presenting the pact as a genuine peace move.63 
The moderate left expressed confused bewilderment but offered little justification for 
Stalin’s actions. Similar appraisals were prominent in centrist and liberal newspapers, 
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especially after the full details of the agreement emerged.64 For the French right, the 
pact was bitter confirmation of what they had always suspected – Soviet Russia was 
duplicitous, untrustworthy, and looking to foment a worldwide Bolshevik revolution. 
Stéphane Lauzanne, in Le Matin, wrote: ‘It was fate, certain and inevitable. The laws 
of nature are always thus. As the horse gallops, as the bird flies, as the fish swims, so 
the Russian Bolshevik betrays. He has duplicity in his blood, and no treatment will 
ever cure it.’65 Elsewhere, Wladimir d’Ormesson viewed recent events as 
confirmation that Moscow was pursuing ‘three policies at once’; La Croix reminded 
its readers of Brest-Litovsk, and the Journal des débats accused the Soviets of acting 
with their habitual lack of grace.66 In Britain, the conservative press focused on the 
solid Franco-British alliance and a determination to uphold those eastern alliances 
already undertaken, but a residual tone of anti-Soviet sentiment permeated most 
analyses.67 Anti-Soviet sentiment had never been far from the surface, and the rapid 
re-emergence of familiar tropes appeared to vindicate the west’s hesitancy throughout 
the negotiations. This ideological hostility had, nevertheless, been marginalised just 
weeks earlier, providing a fleeting but very real opportunity to secure a Triple 
Alliance. This missed opportunity requires a closer examination of how far the press - 
as a perceived conduit of public opinion - could influence foreign policy during this 
frenetic period. 
 
Press commentary, public opinion, and their impact on policy 
 
The preceding overview of the evolution of British and French press commentary 
during the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations provides the backdrop for assessing its 
impact on foreign policy decision-makers. In the immediate aftermath of the Prague 
19 
 
coup, the Soviet Ambassador at London, Ivan Maisky, noted that ‘the [British] 
public’s mood is rapidly hardening’ against Germany, a disconnect emerging between 
a Prime Minister wedded to appeasement and a public fatigued by Nazi bellicosity.68 
This disconnect was echoed in parliamentary circles, where left wing accusations of 
governmental procrastination induced Chamberlain to meet Labour leaders on 24 
March to explain ‘that we weren’t cold-shouldering Russia – it was the misgivings of 
Poland and others.’69 In France, the public’s appetite for a firm response to the 
dictators had only intensified after Prague. Daladier’s chef du cabinet, Roger 
Genebrier, recalled how French public opinion, having ‘become conscious of the 
inexorable march towards war’, was now prepared to sanction an alliance hitherto 
considered unpalatable.70 But although widespread, support for a pact was not 
unanimous. Indeed, the tepid response of French newspapers, especially when 
compared to the chorus of pro-alliance voices emerging in the British press, helps 
explain why Paris allowed London to take the early initiative in the formal 
negotiations.   
 
Growing press interest in a pact was echoed in Parliament, increasing the pressure on 
the Prime Minister. When interrogated in the Commons, Chamberlain insisted that he 
was not animated by ideological aversion, and that ‘we welcome the co-operation of 
any country, whatever may be its internal system of government.’71 Suspicion of the 
Prime Minister lingered, and several Conservative dissidents vocally endorsed a 
Soviet pact, including Churchill who told the Commons that ‘Russia is a ponderous 
counterpoise in the scale of world peace.’72 Similarly, the Home Secretary, Sir John 
Simon, noted that the absence of an agreement ‘would be regarded in many quarters 
as a considerable defeat for our policy,’ and even Chamberlain acknowledged that a 
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‘failure to associate with Soviet Russia would give rise to suspicion and difficulty 
with the Left Wing both in this country and in France’.73 There were even explicit 
calls in the press for a Cabinet re-shuffle.74 Maisky also noted the fevered press 
interest in the Soviet negotiations. Having been summoned to Moscow for talks in 
mid-April, he commented that the British press made ‘a first-class sensation out of my 
trip’, his embassy being inundated with requests for information. Maisky intimated 
further that this press interest was mirrored in governmental circles. ‘The British 
Government seems greatly concerned about my being summoned to Moscow,’ he 
recorded, ‘and wants to convince me … of its sincere wish to work together with us 
on the establishment of a peace front.’75  
 
Nevertheless, Cabinet enthusiasm for a Soviet alliance remained lukewarm. When 
Litvinov forwarded Moscow’s counter-proposals on 18 April, London’s reaction was 
decidedly cool. The demand for a simultaneous political and military agreement 
caused longstanding British scepticism regarding Soviet military capabilities to 
resurface.76 But political opponents of a Soviet alliance ran counter to the prevailing 
direction of popular and press opinion which increasingly demanded an alliance. The 
French government also vented frustration at the lack of results and demanded an 
injection of urgency.77 As Daladier recalled, France was keen for an agreement to be 
reached, and accordingly ‘exercised friendly pressure on Britain.’78 This pressure did 
not sit comfortably with French critics of a Soviet pact, especially on the extreme 
right. For the Action Française, the French government must ‘assume a heavy 
responsibility’ for joining the chorus of voices urging Chamberlain to overcome his 
reservations.79 Paris was, nonetheless, more inclined to accept Moscow’s demands 
than were the British. Even the pro-appeasement Bonnet toed the government line, 
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telling the Soviet Ambassador at Paris, Iakov Surits, that France would welcome a 
tripartite mutual assistance pact.80 Bonnet’s comments fed Moscow’s belief that the 
democracies would concede to their demands, a conviction nourished by western 
press commentary. Maisky was persuaded that even the most fervent British 
appeasers would succumb, press commentary and parliamentary unrest combining to 
force the Prime Minister’s hand.81 Chamberlain was not impervious to pressure, and 
in Cabinet discussions on 5 May he acknowledged that public opinion would despair 
should the Soviet proposals be rejected.82 French discontent was also expressed more 
freely, Bonnet stating plainly that Paris’s proposal for a tripartite agreement ‘was 
preferable’ to the more complicated arrangement favoured by London.83  
 
British policymakers were in a bind: on the one hand, they feared that robust 
agreements with Moscow would antagonise Hitler and prevent the detachment of Italy 
from the Axis; on the other, procrastination alienated not only Paris but also 
considerable sections of domestic opinion.84 A persistent fear also existed that the 
lack of a Russian pact would leave the door ajar for Berlin to make its own 
arrangement with Moscow. Stalin’s dismissal of Litvinov exacerbated this fear. 
Despite assurances from Maisky that Moscow’s attitude remained unchanged, 
Halifax’s private secretary, Oliver Harvey, suspected that ‘it may mean a Russo-
German rapprochement.’85 London hesitated nonetheless, and finally rejected 
Moscow’s 18 April proposals on 13 May. Committing wholeheartedly to a triple 
alliance, and thus closing the door on further acts of appeasement, remained a step too 
far for many in Whitehall. The degree of London’s attachment to the Munich policy 
loomed large in Ambassador Maisky’s mind, and on 9 May he commented that The 
Times had raised the possibility of further appeasement.86 Soviet confidence in France 
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was also shaken, Marcel Déat’s infamous ‘Mourir pour Dantzig’ article, published in 
l’Œuvre on 4 May, casting doubt on the French people’s determination to uphold 
their obligations in eastern Europe. Worried that mutual distrust was clouding the 
negotiations, Bonnet took the initiative by urging London ‘to assure, without further 
delay, a favourable conclusion to the Russian negotiations.’87 
 
Despite lingering suspicions, by late May public pressure dovetailed with other 
factors (fears of a Soviet-German rapprochement, the Chiefs of Staff expressing 
support for a pact, more vocal and insistent French pressure), to persuade the Cabinet 
to pursue a Soviet alliance with more energy. Although committed supporters of 
Chamberlain’s appeasement policy like the Conservative M.P. Henry ‘Chips’ 
Channon resented the apparent change in direction (describing it as the ‘pet scheme of 
the leftist clique in the Foreign Office’88), political support for an alliance was 
becoming widespread. Chamberlain, remarked Halifax, ‘was very reluctant to agree to 
a full tripartite alliance [but] many in the Cabinet favoured it.’89 On 21 May, the 
Prime Minister himself acknowledged that several Cabinet colleagues, who had 
hitherto opposed an alliance ‘now appear to have swung toward the opposite view.’90 
Litvinov’s dismissal did little to dampen pro-alliance sentiment in Britain; the appetite 
had only intensified. For Maisky, the British government was ‘in a tight spot’ given 
that the British press presented Moscow’s demands favourably and in a manner that 
appealed to ordinary people. ‘[W]ere the Anglo-Soviet argument over the terms and 
conditions of agreement to be judged by the British public,’ he noted, ‘Chamberlain 
would most definitely lose.’91  
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If Chamberlain was becoming isolated in Britain, so too were the resolutely anti-
Soviet sections of rightist opinion in France.92 When Daladier told the Chamber on 11 
May that ‘we consider the participation of the USSR as essential and desirable,’ he 
could be confident that the majority of deputies concurred.93 Unlike Chamberlain, the 
French Premier encountered little resistance, only the Communists consistently 
questioning his commitment to an alliance, and even then the pro-appeasement 
Bonnet usually acted as a lightning rod .94 Daladier’s determination to secure a pact 
was not merely for public consumption, as he began to articulate his frustrations to the 
British more vigorously. After presenting Halifax with a draft tripartite agreement in 
Geneva on 21 May, he expressed astonishment at the latter’s reservations, insisting 
that Moscow would not ‘accept anything less.’95 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle contends 
that the pressure exerted on Halifax had an impact, as the British government would, 
by the end of May, eventually accept a tripartite formula.96 French pressure 
undoubtedly contributed, but it was only when fused with domestic factors in Britain 
that Chamberlain softened his resistance. According to Sir Alexander Cadogan, 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain’s position regarding a 
Soviet alliance evolved from adamant opposition on 20 May to reluctant acceptance 
just four days later, when Moscow learned that the British government was willing to 
accept a tripartite agreement of mutual assistance.97  
 
Crucially, however, Britain’s acceptance contained what Chamberlain considered ‘a 
most ingenious’ caveat that insisted the alliance be based upon Article 16 of the 
League Covenant, ultimately giving it ‘a temporary character’ and allowing Britain to 
revise ‘our relations with the Soviet if we want to.’98 Historians offer conflicting 
interpretations of Chamberlain’s machinations at this juncture. Some, like Louise 
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Grace Shaw, condemn it as a ‘premeditated and deliberate act of sabotage,’ while 
Keith Neilson is more sympathetic to the Prime Minister, suggesting that it made a 
Russian alliance more acceptable to those sections of British opinion hostile to the 
USSR.99 If Chamberlain believed that the League caveat was essential to satisfy the 
public, he was clearly oblivious to the majority of press commentary that wanted a 
Soviet alliance with or without reference to Geneva. Of course, Chamberlain’s 
perceptions of public opinion were not nourished by the press alone, and the frequent 
letters he received from his two sisters provided ample reassurance of his continued 
popularity. Indeed, these letters evoked an early example of a ‘Westminster bubble’, 
intimating that the dissent articulated freely in parliamentary debate and newspaper 
editorials failed to reflect the prevailing mood in the country. What mattered, Hilda 
remarked, was not ‘the opinion in the House of Commons [but] the opinion of the 
mass of the people,’ and the majority of the public - the ‘ordinary dull country people, 
councillors, gentry …, the working people’ - all supported the Premier.100 
 
Chamberlain could seek solace in his sisters’ letters even as dissenting voices became 
harder to ignore. On 21 May Hilda even congratulated him on his ‘lofty disregard’ of 
the ‘carping criticism’ that he faced, assuring her brother that his position remained 
‘impregnable in the face of public confidence.’ Ida acknowledged that the campaign 
to secure a Russian alliance was causing Neville ‘a good deal of trouble,’ but felt 
nonetheless that ‘most people in the country’ had confidence in his diplomatic 
strategy. On 28 May, Ida noted a ‘curious phenomenon’ whereby the prominent 
parliamentary critics palpably failed to convey the mood of the country, in which 
Chamberlain enjoyed ‘the kind of popularity unprecedented since the days of Pitt.’101 
That Ida and Hilda felt the need to offer such reassurance suggests that the criticism 
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was affecting the Prime Minister. On 16 June Hilda even intimated that a Soviet pact 
could have been delivered had someone more committed than Chamberlain been in 
charge. ‘No doubt [Eden] or Churchill could have returned triumphantly with an 
alliance in a very short time,’ she wrote in response to the press campaign for a 
Cabinet reshuffle, ‘but it would have meant exactly what you have tried so hard to 
avoid.’102 
 
What Chamberlain sought to avoid – an alliance on terms dictated by Moscow – was 
nonetheless becoming more palatable to the British people. Paris certainly felt that 
public opinion facilitated rather than hindered the conclusion of an alliance, even if 
press speculation concerning the imminence of an agreement was considered ‘too 
optimistic’ by some foreign ministry officials.103Bonnet noted ‘a very strong 
movement of opinion in Britain and France which believes, not unreasonably, that the 
fate of peace depends upon the current negotiations.’104 The Quai d’Orsay shared the 
conviction, gaining ground in the British Foreign Office, that a Soviet pact was both 
expedient and necessary. The Quai’s Secretary-General, Alexis Léger, considered 
Soviet inclusion in the peace front to be ‘critical,’ but admitted that initial British and 
French hesitancy was a prudent negotiating tactic because simple acceptance of 
Moscow’s opening offer would have precluded further concessions from the 
Russians.105 The Soviets, however, were prepared to be patient, waiting until western 
public opinion compelled its reluctant leaders to accept the USSR’s demands. 
Moscow might have expected these pressures to induce significant political changes 
in London and Paris. Daniel Lévi, a French diplomat and a Soviet affairs expert, 
suggested that, should Eden return as British Foreign Secretary and Bonnet be 
replaced as French Foreign Minister, ‘the Russians would conclude more quickly.’106 
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The French government was anxious to avoid the negotiations’ dragging on 
interminably. Daladier in particular was concerned that such an eventuality would 
fracture the fragile domestic unity that he had successfully constructed around a 
politique de fermeté.107 For some historians, particularly French scholars, the greater 
flexibility shown by Paris was fatally undermined by British procrastination, the latter 
reinforcing Soviet suspicions of the west and greatly hindering the chances of 
securing an alliance.108  
 
Given the stakes, London’s attempt to add impetus to the faltering negotiations by 
sending Strang to Moscow, rather than Halifax or Eden, warrants criticism. The 
Russians were clearly offended, and Maisky urged Halifax to travel to the USSR in 
person.109 Cadogan told Corbin that the British government was anxious to avoid 
‘running after’ the Russians, as this would render an eventual failure all the more 
humiliating.110 For the Soviets, however, this half-hearted gesture was especially 
discouraging given the recent tone of British newspapers. Shortly after arriving in the 
Soviet capital, Strang noted that the Soviet government, doubtless influenced by 
appraisals of the western press furnished by Maisky and Surits, was convinced that 
the USSR only needed to ‘stand pat [because] our public will force us to give way.’111 
Indeed, Molotov had earlier told Seeds that he was surprised by the western 
governments’ hesitancy, having been persuaded by press coverage that London and 
Paris would agree to Moscow’s terms.112 The confident conviction that public 
pressure would compel the British and French governments to yield contributed to 
Moscow’s growing demands, notably their insistence that the Baltic States be 
included in any security arrangement. But rather than facilitate an agreement, 
increased Russian demands merely provoked antagonism in London. Governmental 
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scepticism was reinforced, and many newspapers, whose advocacy of an alliance to 
that point had done so much to transcend a latent anti-Soviet hostility, began voicing 
unrest.113 
 
Both sides were locked in a battle, each seeking to frame the negotiations in a 
particular way before the court of British and French public opinion. The USSR had 
been winning this battle comfortably during April and May, but by June tit was less 
clear which side would prevail. Nonetheless, previous representations of a pro-
alliance public opinion continued to reverberate. Halifax certainly considered it 
essential to show something for the weeks of talks, even acceptance of a ‘simple 
tripartite Agreement’ that the Russians had offered, and the British had rejected, back 
in April.114 A straightforward tripartite agreement, shorn of any League-based 
caveats, may have been an option several weeks earlier, but by late June 1939, as 
negotiations stalled over definitions of ‘indirect aggression’ and the possible inclusion 
of the Baltic States, this opportunity appeared lost. Discussions had reached an 
impasse. Bonnet warned Halifax on 19 July that a failure would be ‘disastrous’ both 
for the prospects of peace and on a domestic level given that ‘public opinion in all 
countries attaches the greatest importance’ to a triple alliance.115 From Moscow, 
Strang acknowledged that London was ‘being urged by our press and by our public to 
conclude an agreement quickly.’ Moreover, he continued, ‘the Russians have good 
reason to assume that we shall not dare to face a final breakdown of the 
negotiations.’116  
 
Given that recent British opinion polls indicated overwhelming public support for a 
pact, the Russian conviction that Britain and France would eventually succumb to 
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their demands was reasonable.117 But the public mood – at least as it was reflected in 
the press – had already begun to shift, and this shift would become even more 
discernible during July. Maisky detected this evolution but accused the British 
government of orchestrating it. A ‘major campaign’ was underway, he noted: 
‘rumours are being spread far and wide in the press, Parliament, and public and 
political circles’ that the USSR was being unreasonably stubborn, ‘deliberately 
dragging out the negotiations,’ and even ‘flirting with Hitler.’ This campaign, 
suggested Maisky, was having a wide impact, even having ‘a demoralizing effect’ on 
the British political left.118 Although explicit support for an alliance became less 
prominent, most British newspapers remained cautiously upbeat about the final 
outcome.119 In France, too, optimism prevailed, Daladier telling the journalist Pierre 
Lazareff that, certain difficulties notwithstanding, the ‘conversations are soon going 
to result in an accord très solide.’ Shortly afterwards, when meeting members of the 
French military mission ahead of their mission to Russia, Daladier allegedly told 
General Joseph Doumenc to secure an agreement ‘at any price.’120 
 
The British government showed markedly less urgency, Chamberlain interpreting the 
diminution of pro-alliance press voices as further endorsement of his diplomacy. His 
recent visit to South Wales had, according to his sister Hilda, allowed him to see ‘the 
place you hold in the hearts’ of the people and provided a welcome antidote to the 
‘carping criticism’ in London. Ida concurred, assuring her brother that a general 
election would confirm his popularity with the masses and illustrate ‘to what a very 
limited group of people criticism is confined.’121 London’s unhurried approach to the 
dispatch of their military mission infuriated Paris, Bonnet criticising the British 
government for introducing ‘excessive’ delays.122 London procrastinated further by 
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sending the military delegation by slow boat, a decision that several historians use to 
question Chamberlain’s commitment to the talks.123 How far such procrastination 
encouraged or even justified the USSR’s pursuit of an alternative arrangement with 
Berlin is questionable. As this discussion of Soviet assumptions regarding British and 
French public opinion shows, Moscow’s courting of Germany was due not simply to 
taking offence at British lassitude, but also an overestimation of their relative 
bargaining position. Gabriel Gorodetsky questions the idea that the USSR only agreed 
to a German pact ‘under duress’ and ‘at the twelfth hour,’ arguing that the ex-post-
facto Soviet narrative, ‘meticulously constructed and widely disseminated by Maisky’ 
in a bid to justify the Nazi-Soviet arrangement, is not supported by the evidence.124 Of 
course, the ill-fated military missions to Moscow illustrated emphatically the almost 
insurmountable ideological differences that plagued the negotiations from their 
inception. The British delegates were instructed to go slowly, and the issue of whether 
Soviet troops would be permitted access through Poland and Romania was always 
likely to be an insuperable hurdle.125 All the same, news that Berlin and Moscow had 
signed a non-aggression pact was a devastating blow to the western democracies and 
denied them Russian assistance in a war that now appeared imminent. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The speed with which Germany and Russia came to terms brought into sharper focus 
just how drawn-out, protracted, and tempestuous the Anglo-Franco-Soviet discussions 
had been. The temptation to blame the western governments for these failed 
negotiation remains potent, and has been revisited energetically by historians like 
Michael Jabara Carley, Louise Grace Shaw, and Annie Lacroix-Riz. Animated chiefly 
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by anti-Soviet ideological hostility, so the argument goes, the western governments 
never sufficiently committed to a pact and compelled Stalin to align with Berlin. 
Prominent decision-makers, notably Neville Chamberlain, certainly doubted the value 
of a Soviet alliance, and ideological scruples undoubtedly clouded their judgements. It 
is also clear that, by pledging support to Poland and Romania before the USSR’s 
accession to the peace front, Britain and France had given a de facto guarantee to 
Moscow without obtaining a quid pro quo. Nevertheless, the Anglo-Franco-Soviet 
talks revealed points of shared interest that posed the potential for an alliance. Both 
parties had a common enemy in Nazi Germany; Litvinov was an apostle of collective 
security, and even after his dismissal from office there was no immediate realignment 
of Soviet policy; a military and strategic appreciation indicated that only with Russian 
support could the guarantees provided to Warsaw and Bucharest be upheld; for many 
on the political right, pragmatism overcame ideological aversion, allowing them to 
embrace a Soviet alliance; and, most crucially, public opinion in both Britain and 
France was ready to accept an alliance even on terms dictated chiefly by Moscow. In 
combination, these factors persuaded even the most reluctant policymakers to 
respond. As Carley has remarked, ‘Chamberlain did not want an alliance with the 
Soviet Union [but] public opinion and Parliament pushed him further than he wanted 
to go.’126  
 
The opportunity to develop these points of common interest into a fully-fledged 
alliance, however, was fleeting. G. Bruce Strang’s argument that a ‘desperate, over-
committed British government’ sought speed whilst the Russians ‘willingly tolerated 
delay’ is not without merit, especially when applied to the negotiations from June to 
August .127 Speed was absent when it might have yielded a positive outcome during 
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May and June; thereafter, the fusion of conditions that fleetingly made an alliance 
possible began to fragment. By this juncture, even making a ‘decisive gesture’ 
capable of breaking ‘the crust of Soviet incomprehension’ was unlikely to produce 
positive outcomes.128 After all, previous public enthusiasm only encouraged Moscow 
to increase their price, hindering rather than facilitating agreement. By introducing 
problematic issues concerning the Baltic States and definitions of ‘indirect 
aggression’, Moscow encouraged anti-Soviet sentiment to resurface. The Russians 
had miscalculated, and their inflated expectations of how far western public opinion 
was prepared to go in pursuit of a ‘Grand Alliance’ led them to demand too much. 
The negotiations continued regardless, but the chances of success were bleak at best 
and non-existent at worst. Agreement was only possible if sufficient pressure was 
applied to recalcitrant policymakers – particularly in London but also in Paris – by 
press and public opinion. Such pressure existed from mid-April through early June 
1939, but this glimmer of opportunity was ephemeral. It was only at this juncture, 
rather than at the outset of the talks, that an alliance was possible.  
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